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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On September 4th, 2014, Officer Sean Groubert of the South 
Carolina State Police pulled his police cruiser behind the vehicle 
driven by Levar Jones at a gas station in South Carolina. Officer 
Jones would later state the reason he pulled behind Jones was 
because he observed Jones was not wearing his seat belt. Jones would 
later state he removed his seat belt upon pulling into the gas station 
to exit his vehicle and enter the station. All of the following events 
were captured by the dash-cam in Officer Groubert’s car.1 
Levar Jones exited his vehicle and, with his car door still 
open, noticed the police vehicle behind him. His face exhibited 
surprise and confusion.2 Officer Groubert requested Jones’ license in 
a controlled speaking voice.3 Jones pats his pocket, and realizing his 
wallet is not there, does a rapid shoulder shift from facing Groubert 
to facing the inside of his vehicle.4 He then leans into the vehicle as 
an ordinary place to secure his wallet, which he had left sitting on the 
front seat.5 However, Officer Groubert (apparently) viewed the rapid 
shoulder shift as an aggressive and hostile act. In the next three 
seconds of film, he shouts “Get out of the Car!” twice, runs to cover 
behind Jones’ vehicle and fires four shouts at Jones.6 The first shot 
hits Jones while he is turning around with the wallet in his hand. He 
drops the wallet and backs away from the officer while putting his 
hands up while three more shots hit him. In the same dash-cam 
video, Groubert later describes the events to his supervisor.7 
Groubert describes Jones’ surprise and confusion as an act of 
“staring him down”; Jones’ leaning into his vehicle to secure his 
                                                 
1 This video can be found in many places on the internet. The one we will 
reference is available at: The State Newspaper, Sept 4 Groubert traffic stop, YOUTUBE 
(Sept. 24, 2014), https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=RBUUO_VFYMs. 
2 Id. at time stamp :40. 
3 Id. at time stamp :42. 
4 Id. at time stamp :43 - :44. 
5 Id. at time stamp :45. 
6 Id. at time stamp :46 - :49. 
7 This longer video can be found at: Tony Santaella and Steven Dial, Trooper 
on Shooting: ‘He Kept Coming Towards Me’, WLTX19 (Sept. 27, 2014), 
http://www.wltx.com/story/news/local/2014/09/26/sean-groubert-gives-his-
account-of-shooting-levar-jones/16295527/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017). 
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wallet as an act of “diving into his vehicle”; Jones’ acts of walking 
backwards while putting his hands up as “he kept coming at me”; and 
Jones’ wallet as a perceived weapon.8 
On the one hand we could assume these to be self-serving 
and dishonest statements by Officer Groubert. This assumption is 
not necessary and it is far more probative to view them as the honest 
(mis)perception of a shooter in a perceived hostile environment. 
Under that lens, Groubert’s statements reflect a perception of an 
African American male as a potential hostile in an asymmetric 
battlefield-like environment,9 and give a rare insight into a shooter’s 
psyche – a rapid, stress-filled situation.   
The landscape of modern asymmetric conflicts, such as the 
war in Afghanistan, is also murky. The Soldier, like the police officer, 
is burdened with the reality that he does not know who the bad guy is 
and who the innocent is. But the rules governing the Soldier are 
starkly different than those governing the police officer for sound 
and logical reasons. In a New York Times editorial, U.S. Marine Corps 
Captain Timothy Kudo discusses his own use of force in 
Afghanistan.10 While a commander, he was asked permission by his 
Marines to kill two Afghans: “The voice on the other end of the 
radio said: ‘There are two people digging by the side of the road. Can 
we shoot them?’” The presumption is the two were implanting an 
improvised explosion device – known as an IED – to kill or injure 
Afghan or coalition Soldiers. Captain Kudo gave permission and the 
two diggers were killed.11 There was an ever-present possibility the 
diggers were merely irrigating their farm land and not sowing seeds of 
violence toward Captain Kudo, his Marines, and the Afghan State. 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 The attitude of police in the United States towards African American 
males has been the subject of much commentary and literature and is not the 
subject of this piece. We mention it as a basis of comparison to the view of Soldiers 
towards potential threats in the modern asymmetric battlefield. 
10 Timothy Kudo, Editorial, How We Learned to Kill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2015, New York Edition at SR1. 
11 Id. 
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How we assess the use of force and whether force is 
appropriate in any given situation is instrumental to how we function 
as a deliberative democracy. While we might all agree Officer 
Groubert’s actions are reprehensible and probably criminal, Captain 
Kudo’s are less open to clear judgment. Should the judgment depend 
on whether Captain Kudo was ultimately correct; that is, the diggers 
were, in fact, bad guys, rather than innocent farmers making a living? 
If Levar Jones had held up a gun rather than a wallet upon exiting his 
vehicle, the authorities would probably have viewed Officer 
Groubert’s actions differently. But the true (rather than perceived) 
battlefield is a significantly different legal reality where far greater 
uses of force have been permitted, including knowingly causing the 
death of innocents.12 Evaluating Captain Kudo’s actions is made 
problematic by the blending of warfighting with peacekeeping and 
even battlefield law enforcement mandated by asymmetric warfare.   
Among the volumes written on when force can be exercised 
by Soldiers during armed conflict in the name of the State, the trend 
over the last century has been to curtail a Soldier’s use of force and 
rightfully so. The adoption by virtually every State13 of The Hague 
Conventions in 1907,14 the Geneva Conventions15 in the wake of 
World War II, along with their Protocols in 1977,16 has been with a 
                                                 
12 Under the concept of proportionality, lawful combatants can knowingly 
cause the incidental death of innocent noncombatants if the military advantage 
gained exceeds their loss. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
13 The International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter “ICRC”] tracks 
the current signatories to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
at https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-
conventions (The Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been ratified by every 
member state of the United Nations). 
14 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 
2277, October 18, 1907. 
15 Jean S. Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, 45 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 462 (1951). 
16 Additional Protocol I and Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 
[hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”]. 
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singular purpose: to limit the devastation inflicted by armed conflict. 
Armed conflict, however, persists. Whether it is the war in 
Afghanistan or the crisis in the Ukraine, bloodshed of both innocent 
civilians and lawful combatants/privileged belligerents17 is a 
persistent reality. In the modern era, complicating the calculus of 
how to limit the destruction of war, many of these armed conflicts 
are fueled by actors who refuse to wear military uniforms, carry their 
arms openly, and become privileged belligerents; these actors lurk 
amongst civilians and never show their true intent until they strike. 
In the last decade, the trajectory of some courts, academics, 
and even military leaders of States18 is to limit the force States’ 
militaries can use during conflict. The intent of these limits on what 
force, including lethal force, militaries can use to accomplish the 
mission is quite noble. The logic is the less force used by a Soldier, 
the less death and destruction inflicted upon innocents. However, 
these limitations are tainted by misunderstandings and mistakes 
concerning the principles and goals of the Just War Theory, 
particularly in the evaluation of battlefield conduct: jus in bello. 
Academics and jurists have extrapolated familiar concepts 
from criminal law jurisprudence, those used to evaluate Officer 
Groubert’s conduct, such as intent, necessity, and proportionality, 
and attempted to apply them to evaluate the acts of the privileged 
belligerent.19 The attempt to make the dissimilar into the similar is 
understandable because man habitually tries to characterize the 
unfamiliar by extrapolating from a familiar paradigm. However, while 
the same terms may be used,20 the meaning of those terms differ 
                                                 
17 “The term “privileged belligerent” means an individual belonging to one 
of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 10 U.S.C. § 948a(6). 
18 Examples of each are discussed later in this chapter. 
19 See GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING 
HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 
2008) [hereinafter “Defending Humanity”] for an extrapolation of criminal law 
concepts to jus ad bellum, an extrapolation that makes much more sense than to jus 
in bello. 
20 Both the criminal law and the jus in bello paradigms include common 
terms such as self-defense and necessity, but the meanings can vary significantly. 
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significantly between law enforcement and war.21 This extrapolation 
manifests itself in applying human rights law norms and the universal 
reach of an individual’s right to life. Criminal law exists to preserve 
the peace, whereas jus in bello works to end conflict.22 
Exacerbating the problem is the other half of the Just War 
Theory, jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is a set of international principles 
regulating when the State can initiate armed conflict. Extrapolating 
criminal law jurisprudence to evaluate jus ad bellum actions is rational 
because the goals and core concepts of the two paradigms are nearly 
identical:23 In both systems, the “citizens” (individuals in criminal law, 
States in jus ad bellum) lose the ability to use violence to achieve their 
aims except in rare circumstances where the violence is legally 
authorized (law enforcement and U.N. Security Council Resolution) 
or justified (self-defense of the individual and the state). Further, 
both share a common fundamental goal: preserving the peace. 
Therefore, using criminal law concepts and jurisprudence to evaluate 
jus ad bellum action, as proposed by George Fletcher and Jens Ohlin in 
Defending Humanity, is proper.24 The reason: the words and meaning are 
the same. What is not defensible, morally or legally, is using this 
similarity as a gateway to then apply criminal law concepts to jus in 
bello where these substantive and goal similarities do not exist. The 
words may be the same, but the meaning is different. 
                                                 
21 A good example of this divergence is the concept of self-defense. In the 
criminal law paradigm, the individual’s right of self-defense is limited by, among 
other things, the responsibility to not cause the death of anyone but the aggressor, 
and the ability to use force in self-defense is limited to the timeframe of the 
aggression. In contrast, on the battlefield, a lawful combatant can knowingly cause 
the death of an innocent in self-defense, provided the death is incidental and that it 
is exceeded by the military advantage of staying alive. Further, the lawful combatant 
can engage in status rather than conduct based self-defense. 
22 “The object of war has been understood to be the submission of the 
enemy as quickly and efficiently as possible.” The Department of DOD LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL, June 2015, [hereinafter “DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL”] paragraph 
1.4.1 citing 1940 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶22 (“The object of war is to 
bring about the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible by means of 
regulated violence.”); 1914 RULES OF LAND WARFARE ¶10 (same). 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
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This extrapolation of criminal law concepts to the battlefield 
is not defensible because in armed conflict a commander’s calculus 
revolves around military necessity--defined as “the necessity of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, 
and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of 
war.”25 The commander must balance, on one hand, the necessary 
precautions to protect civilians with, on the other hand, the 
commander’s conclusion of military necessity. Imbedded in this 
conclusion is military judgment. This concept simply does not exist in 
domestic criminal law. And with any judgment, especially one which 
stems from whether necessary precautions were taken in light of the 
military action in the name of military necessity, there is the element 
of subjectivity. The modern trend has been to extend “the domestic 
law of negligence to the battle zone – where civilian norms of duty of 
care” are applied to military decisions.26 This means civilian criminal 
standards are being applied to decisions made in war. The 
manifestation of this trend is to focus on the results of the military 
decision after the fact (e.g., were civilians killed?), rather than focus on 
the rationale of the military act under current International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL).27 
Conflating civilian criminal standards with the rationale of a 
military act under IHL comes at a high cost for democratic armies 
and has, in these authors’ opinion, not been fully debated. The 
biggest cost is to the effectiveness of a State’s military to bring an end 
to armed conflict. Efforts to protect the enemy belligerent and 
innocent civilians by limiting the Soldier’s lethality acts to defeat a 
                                                 
25 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.2.1 citing, among multiple 
other sources, General Order No. 100, the Instructions for the Government of 
Armies of the United States in the Field, commonly known as the Lieber Code art. 
14 (“Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the 
necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the 
war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.”). 
26 Thomas Tugendhat & Laura Croft, The Fog of Law: An Introduction to the 
Legal Erosion of British Fighting Power, Policy Exchange (2013) at 11, 
https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/the-fog-of-law.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2017). 
27 International Humanitarian Law is synonymous with the Law of War and 
the Law of Armed Conflict. This body of international law regulates the conduct of 
forces when engaged in war and armed conflict. 
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fundamental goal of jus in bello, bringing about an end to the war; 
therefore causing an increase, rather than decrease, of violence. 
Unrealistic limitations on the Soldier means there are rules he 
can never overcome. If the acid test is to kill no civilians, for 
example, then closing with and killing or capturing an amorphous 
enemy who looks and acts like a civilian is profoundly difficult, if not 
impossible. Placing limitations on the Soldier limits their ability to 
exercise the principle of military necessity and, therefore, defeats one 
of the core principles of the Just War Theory.    
This article will argue the right of the Soldier to engage and 
destroy military objectives is inherent to warfare; efforts to stem or 
limit this force need to be fully understood and carefully considered 
within jus in bello instead of the criminal law paradigm. Failure to do 
so may actually increase violence rather than decrease it, as well as 
violate the State’s sacred obligation to its designated belligerents: 
Soldiers. 
Even though the Soldier is legally and morally blameless for 
his presence on the battlefield, he loses the protections of the civilian 
criminal law against violence. In exchange for this sacrifice, the 
Soldier gains the right to use violence to execute the mission and 
bring about an end to the war. Forcing the Soldier to waive his right 
to the protections of the law while simultaneously denying him the 
ability to effectively accomplish his mission reduces him to nothing 
more than a designated target for those who oppose his State. 
This article will start with a brief introduction to the core 
principles of the Just War Theory and use these to identify its 
fundamental goals. This section will examine the differences between 
privileged belligerents and civilians and highlight why the rights of 
privileged belligerents cannot tether to the concepts or goals of 
domestic criminal law. The second part of the article will then 
examine five specific trends which are part and parcel to the 
pervasive wave against the use of force and the actual or potential 
cost to how Soldiers behave in conflict; that is, jus in bello. The 
authors will ultimately conclude that until war itself is fully eliminated 
from the human experience, the lex specialis of jus in bello within the 
Just War Theory is pragmatically justified and a morally mandated 
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duty of the international community of States to privileged 
belligerents. 
II.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION OF THE JUST WAR THEORY AND A 
COMPARISON TO TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
The Just War Theory has traditionally28 been divided into the 
morality of a State or group’s decision to engage in armed conflict, jus 
ad bellum, and the manner in which armed conflict is conducted, jus in 
bello.29 
Jus ad bellum has evolved from the right of states to use war to 
achieve political ends, enforce treaties, and in reprisal, to the far more 
restrictive modern approach of Article 2(4) of the United Nations 
Charter, which requires States to “…refrain from the threat or use of 
force against .. any state” in order to “…maintain international peace 
and security.”30 The only commonly recognized exceptions to this 
prohibition are the use of force authorized by the Security Council31 
and the use of force in self-defense under Article 5132 of the same 
charter. In this regard, jus ad bellum mirrors the paradigm of civilian 
criminal law in both goal (preserving peace) and substance (the 
                                                 
28 Modern academics have posited a third area of concern within the Just 
War Theory, that of jus post bellum, or the responsibility of belligerent states after the 
conclusion of armed conflict. 
29 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT 
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 21 (Basic Books, 3RD ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
“Walzer”]: “War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states 
have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means they adopt. The first kind 
of judgment is adjectival in character: we say that a particular war is just or unjust. 
The second is adverbial: we say that a war is being fought justly or unjustly.” 
30 Charter of the United Nations, Jun. 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 article 2(4) 
[hereinafter “UN Charter”]. 
31 Id. at article 24(2) “The specific powers granted to the Security Council 
for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.” 
These powers include the ability to use force for Chapter VI peacekeeping, or 
Chapter VII peace enforcement. 
32 Id. at article 51 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”  
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individual’s ability to use force is limited to situations justified by an 
external imminent threat). 
A. The Uniqueness of Jus in bello 
Unlike jus ad bellum, which evolved almost entirely based on 
international agreement,33 jus in bello is primarily the product of 
custom. Modern treaties, such as the four Geneva Conventions and 
its Protocols, have acted to codify rules evolved from core principles 
developed by the practice of professional warfighters over centuries.34 
These principles include Distinction, Military Necessity, and 
Proportionality. 
1. The Principle of Distinction.35  
Any analysis of jus in bello should begin with the principle of 
distinction, because it is the springing condition for the lex specialis. 
Said another way, without the application of the principle of 
distinction, the substance of traditional criminal law is an entirely 
adequate tool to determine the legality of a given act. The principle 
subdivides into: A) the responsibility of combatants to distinguish 
themselves from civilians; and B) the responsibility to target only 
enemy combatants and military objectives with attacks.36 
                                                 
33 Prior to its conclusion in the U.N. Charter, the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremburg identified the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 as a source of 
restrictions on the power of jus ad bellumjus ad bellum for signees. 
34 The Lieber Code is often cited as the first documentation of the modern 
laws of war. This code was not a creative work, but rather the result of Francis 
Lieber working on a committee of military professionals to codify existing 
customary practice that had been developed over centuries. 
35 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL paragraph 2.5. 
36 Id. 
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(i) The Responsibility of Combatants to Distinguish Themselves from 
Civilians.  
International law grants combatants the legal and moral 
authority to commit violent acts that would otherwise be abhorrent 
and punishable under traditional criminal law.37 This privileged 
belligerency allows them to shoot and kill enemy Soldiers based on 
their mere status as members of the enemy military force.38 Criminal 
law would only allow this attack if properly imposing a death 
sentence on the victim39 or if the victim was posing an imminent 
threat to the shooter (or another) and the shot was a proportional 
response to that threat40 (e.g., without a current imminent threat, 
Officer Groubert could not shoot Levar Jones even if Jones was the 
worst criminal in history). 
Further, except in the case of a death sentence and in 
preventing the escape of an individual who poses a significant threat 
of death or serious bodily harm to the officer or others,41 law 
enforcement officers have no greater privilege to use deadly force 
than an ordinary citizen. The privileged belligerent does not suffer 
any of these limitations. She can kill her victim while he sleeps from 
one thousand miles away, facing no imminent threat whatsoever.42 
For this privileged belligerent to gain this legal authority to target and 
do violence to others, however, she must first set herself out as a 
                                                 
37 The specific language used denotes privileged belligerency as a ‘right.’ 
“Members of the armed forces…have a right to participate directly in hostilities.” 
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43(2). 
38 ICRC Commentary on the Additional Protocol I 1453 (¶4789) “Those 
who belong to armed forces or armed groups may be attacked at any time.” 
39 In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) the United States Supreme 
Court overturned its decision of four years earlier in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972), and held that capital punishment was a lawful use of force and not 
prohibited by the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
40 Model Penal Code [MPC] §3.04 “…the use of force upon or toward 
another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately 
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 
such other person.” & 3.05 “…the use of force upon or toward the person of 
another is justifiable to protect a third person when…the actor would be justified 
under Section 3.04 in using such force to protect himself.” 
41 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985). 
42 Tugendhat & Croft, supra note 26. 
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lawful target,43 such that she can also legally be killed while sleeping 
by an enemy she has never met, let alone threatened. Combatants 
that distinguish themselves from civilians are the only individuals 
authorized to commit these violent acts of war authorized by jus in 
bello; 44 all others must comply with the mandates of criminal law. 
(ii) The Responsibility to Target only Enemy Combatants and Military 
Objectives.  
Though it may seem counterintuitive, the restriction to limit 
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives applies only to 
combatants – privileged belligerents. This does not mean civilians – 
noncombatants – can target other civilians at will. It means if they are 
not a combatant, a civilian cannot target anyone, except when their 
conduct would be justified by traditional criminal law. Only the 
privileged belligerent can step outside the constraints of traditional 
criminal law, but when they do so, they must limit the targets of their 
attacks to enemy combatants and military objectives.45 
B. The Principle of Military Necessity46 
In addition to the principle of distinction, the concept of 
privileged belligerency is inextricably linked to a second principle of 
jus in bello, military necessity. Distinction clarifies what one must do to 
qualify for the privilege, and military necessity identifies what violent 
powers one is granted. In simplest terms, the principle of military 
necessity authorizes the combatant to do acts of violence against the 
enemy military that are needed to bring about the complete 
submission of that enemy and an end to the war.47 Once again, 
                                                 
43 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 
12 August 1949 [hereinafter “Geneva III”] at Art. 4. 
44 DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, paragraph 5.5.8. 
45 It is this second part of the Principle of Distinction that prohibits 
indiscriminate attacks. Thus, it is often referred to as the Principle of 
Discrimination. The authors view this as a subset of Distinction rather than a 
separate Principle. 
46 See DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 25. 
47 Id. 
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however, this does not apply to civilians or civilian law enforcement. 
Officer Groubert may have the mission to apprehend a violent felon, 
but without probable cause of a significant threat to the officer or 
others, he is authorized to only use ordinary force to make an arrest.48 
The principle of military necessity has both a permissive and a 
restrictive aspect, as well as providing the lawful combatant a moral 
foundation for his acts of violence. 
1. The Privilege of Strategic Justification for Acts of Violence.  
A civilian is authorized to do limited violence to rebuff an 
imminent threat. A civilian must justify each act of violence based on 
contemporaneous and proximate danger to themselves or others.49 
For the combatant, eliminating a threat to themselves is merely 
ancillary to their duty to win the war as rapidly as possible. Therefore, 
a combatant’s acts must be evaluated in the much broader context of 
how they affect the war effort and not just the narrow frame of time 
and place the act occurred. A combatant can blow up a bridge built 
by farmers to get to their fields, not because of any threat posed by 
those farmers, but because she has reason to believe the enemy plans 
to use the bridge to transport troops across the river two weeks in 
the future.   
2. The Restrictive Side of Military Necessity.  
This principle is both permissive, allowing the combatant to 
do all acts necessary to win the war, and restrictive, prohibiting 
violent acts which would otherwise be lawful, if they are not needed 
for victory. On the restrictive side is the prohibition against attacks 
that cause unnecessary suffering.50 Putting glass shrapnel in a grenade 
so subsequent surgery will be more difficult is an example of violence 
                                                 
48 See generally Gregg, 428 U.S. (This is the rule of Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1 (1985)). 
49 MPC §3.04 & 3.05. 
50 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 70. 
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that goes beyond the principle of necessity.51 A second part of the 
restrictive side of military necessity (as well as the discrimination 
aspect of distinction) is the concept of humane treatment.52 Once 
Soldiers become hors de combat by being injured, surrendering, or 
evacuating a sinking boat or crashing plane, they are no longer lawful 
targets. Further, the capturing party has a plethora of responsibilities 
for their welfare.53 
3. The Combatant’s Raison d’Etre.  
Perhaps the most important aspect of military necessity is 
that it is inextricably linked to bringing about an end to hostilities. 
The lawful combatant is not a mercenary performing a service for a 
fee. Instead, she is the designated agent of the State sent to engage in 
and be the target of horrific violence. The lawful combatant loses the 
protections of the law and in exchange is offered immunity for their 
acts of combat. The moral individual would never stomach this loss 
merely so they can do greater acts of violence against strangers. They 
sacrifice, sometimes involuntarily,54 the protections of the law for the 
higher purpose of bringing about an end to the armed conflict 
through victory over the enemy. The principle of military necessity 
protects their ability to achieve victory and thus provides the 
foundational explanation for the very existence of the military. 
                                                 
51 Unnecessary Suffering is often cited as a separate Principle of jus in bello, 
but since it is merely the negative corollary of Military Necessity (One can do only 
that violence which is necessary, so causing suffering that is not is prohibited) we 
prefer to view it as a subset. 
52 Humanity or Humane Treatment is also often viewed as a totally separate 
Principle, but the authors view it as a subset of both Military Necessity and 
Distinction since its fundamental principles are again a limitation on unnecessary 
violence against noncombatants and the suffering thereof. 
53 Geneva III, supra note 43. 
54 The Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 201-214 (1917) required 
registration for a draft, or the governmental act of forcing an individual into the 
military. 
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C.  The Principle of Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality requires the anticipated result 
of any attack to bring about a military advantage exceeding the 
collateral damage to civilians and civilian property.55 Like military 
necessity, this principle is both permissive and restrictive. 
As noted above, the lawful purpose of a combatant’s acts of 
war is not to secure their personal safety, but to bring about the end 
of the conflict. The latter is much more difficult to achieve as well as 
significantly more important to the international community. As 
such, the combatants have been granted far greater leniency than 
civilians when the effects of their violent acts are legally analyzed. If a 
civilian knowingly brings about the death of a non-aggressing person, 
this is considered intentional homicide even if the actor did not desire 
death to occur.56 If Officer Groubert, while chasing a group of 
fleeing violent felons, knowingly drives his vehicle over and kills a 
bystander civilian to avoid losing his targets, this is murder regardless 
of his benevolent motive to stop the violent felons from escaping.57 
However, if a combatant blows up the enemy commander’s car, 
purposefully killing him and knowingly killing his three-year-old 
daughter who is riding with him, the attack would be perfectly legal 
under jus in bello if the concrete military advantage gained by the 
commander’s death outweighed the death of the innocent girl. As 
noted in the discussion of the principle of distinction, above, the 
combatant could never target the little girl, but under the principle of 
proportionality, her collateral death could be legally acceptable under 
jus in bello. Like military necessity, this concept of legally acceptable 
collateral damage is limited to the privileged belligerent. The civilian 
is not authorized to attack the enemy commander even if the girl is 
not present. 
                                                 
55 Additional Protocol I, art. 52. 
56 MPC §210.2. 
57 Id. 
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1. The Goals of the Just War Theory.  
The two sides of the Just War Theory, jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello, have significantly different, though sequential and convergent 
goals. Both strive to limit the costs of armed conflict. The former 
attempts to achieve this by the singular goal of preventing the 
occurrence and existence of armed conflict. If jus ad bellum fails and 
armed conflict begins, it falls to jus in bello to limit the violence 
through three goals: ending the conflict, limiting the cost to lawful 
combatants, and limiting the violence done to noncombatants. 
The goal of jus ad bellum is overt – to maintain international 
peace and security by preventing armed conflict.58 This parallels the 
civilian government’s law enforcement mission of maintaining peace 
and security by preventing violent (and nonviolent) crime. 
The goals of jus in bello, though less obvious, can be gleaned 
from the three core principles discussed above. When viewed 
together, the requirement to distinguish oneself under the principle 
of distinction, the ability to do violence strategically motivated under 
military necessity, and the increased lenience towards collateral 
damage encapsulated within proportionality, coalesce into the 
purpose of bringing about a rapid end to the armed conflict. The 
concepts of privileged belligerency and humane treatment combine 
to evince a second purpose – limiting the cost of war paid by its 
participants. A third purpose, shown by the requirement of 
discrimination, is to limit the cost of war paid by the innocent 
civilian. 
Each of these is a noble and laudable purpose integral to the 
Just War Theory. However, it appears that in the modern asymmetric 
environment, some want to prioritize the third goal to the detriment 
of the first two. Comments and decisions by leaders, academics, and 
jurists who desire to prevent military violence, while laudable, reflect 
a lack of appreciation of the first two purposes in the jus in bello 
paradigm as well as the core legal concepts within this lex specialis. 
                                                 
58 Preamble to the UN Charter. 
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2. The Required Gap Between Civilians and Privileged Belligerents 
Under the Lex Specialis of Jus in bello.  
The foundation of all jus in bello is the concept of privileged 
belligerency. The legal gap between the privileged belligerent and the 
civilian is arguably greater than any other that could be drawn 
between two people. While the police officer may have more legal 
authority to use some force than the citizen, it pales in relation to the 
Soldier’s license to kill. The death-row convict may have forfeited his 
fundamental right to life based on his prior acts, but he still stands 
closer to the ordinary citizen than the Soldier whose life becomes 
legally forfeit through no act of his own.59 This gap is why the first 
and most important question of evaluating the legality of any act of 
combat is: was the actor a privileged belligerent? 
If the answer to this antecedent question is no, there is no 
need to look to the lex specialis of IHL to evaluate their conduct; 
criminal law is fully capable of this adjudication. However, if the 
answer is yes, the actor was a privileged belligerent, then criminal law 
is irrelevant and only IHL should be used to evaluate their acts of 
combat.60 
If a person is unprivileged (i.e., a civilian), he is prohibited 
from the use of violence against persons or property of another 
except when that conduct is legally justified or excused and a 
proportional response to an imminent threat. This prohibition is the 
product of the comparatively consistent jurisprudence of criminal law 
developed over millennia. In contrast, the privileged belligerent (i.e., 
the Soldier) is permitted to use violence to destroy property and kill 
people. Further, these acts of violence can be grossly disproportional 
to a threat that is distant in both time and place. For example, a 
privileged belligerent controlling a piece of field artillery in an armed 
conflict can use the weapon to kill 1,000 enemy Soldiers 20 miles 
                                                 
59 As stated above, even involuntary membership in the armed forces makes 
you a lawful target of the enemy privileged belligerent. 
60 The legal maxim is “lex specialis derogat legi generali” so the lex specialis of 
IHL takes precedence over the more general criminal law. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Maxwell & Meyer 5:1 
129 
away even if they are sitting down to dinner and have no plans to 
attack him.61 
For the civilian, the battlefield, in and of itself, does not grant 
him any additional legal authority to use force. Legally, a citizen on 
the battlefield operates under the same restrictions as one caught in a 
gunfight between police and a group of bank robbers. The situation 
may give rise to the legal ability to use violence based on justification 
(self-defense) or excuse (necessity), but this will be factually 
dependent and temporarily linked to the existence of a given 
imminent threat.62 
The Soldier goes through a dramatic legal conversion once 
armed conflict begins. The Soldier morphs from a civilian legally 
indistinguishable from any other concerning the use of force, to a 
new type of legal entity authorized by the world community to use 
deadly force. As noted above, the Soldier is even authorized to 
knowingly kill innocent civilians, provided their deaths are 
outweighed by the concrete military advantage gained.   
Criminal law prohibits a civilian from using force or violence 
except in narrow circumstances such as self-defense. Therefore, the 
principles embedded in jus in bello – military necessity, proportionality, 
and distinction – do not provide any additional legal guidance with 
which to evaluate their acts. A civilian is not allowed to use violence 
to achieve his goals, military or otherwise, so the principle of military 
necessity never applies. A civilian is prohibited from knowingly or 
recklessly causing the deaths of innocent civilians, or damage to their 
property, so any argument that the loss was proportional to what he 
hoped to gain will fall on deaf ears. Concerning distinction, a civilian 
is not authorized to use unjustified violence against any target, 
                                                 
61 The concept of proportionality limit collateral damage to civilians and 
civilian property, it does not limit damage to lawful targets. Members of the enemy 
military are lawful targets at all times unless they become hors d’combat by 
surrendering, being wounded to the point they can no longer fight, becoming 
unconscious, entering the water after their warship is sunk, or parachuting from a 
destroyed aircraft for safety. 
62 MPC §3. 
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whether it be military or civilian, so limiting his strikes to military 
targets is legally insignificant.63 
A Soldier can be killed on the battlefield, but she is immune 
from prosecution or punishment for her lawful acts of combat, (i.e., 
as long as her battlefield acts do not violate jus in bello she cannot be 
criminally judged even if her side loses the war). The rationale is 
Soldiers have no control over if or when they will be sent to armed 
conflict; therefore, it is patently unjust both to punish them for that 
collective decision (jus ad bellum) and to use rules which are applicable 
domestically (criminal law instead of jus in bello). 
III.  PART II – CONFLATION & MISUNDERSTANDING ERRORS IN 
THE TREND AGAINST THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE 
The errors in the trend against the use of military force fall 
into five general categories: 1) a conflation of jus in bello with jus ad 
bellum; 2) a morphing of the military mission away from traditional 
war-fighting responsibilities, thereby frustrating the jus in bello goals of 
a rapid end to the conflict and limiting the cost to the warfighter; 3) a 
conflation of jus in bello concepts with similar terms in the traditional 
criminal law paradigm; 4) an attempt by some academics to revise 
time-tested principles in IHL that are the product of centuries of 
customary practice, and, 5) a general lack of military deference in 
modern courts by jurists with no military experience or valid frame of 
reference. 
The costs of these errors are high: an ineffective military 
prolongs armed conflict through impotence and indecision, and 
victimizes the modern warfighter by leaving her outside the 
protections of the law; denying her the higher purpose of ending the 
armed conflict; and, reducing her to the legal peer of the criminals64 
she is forced to oppose. 
                                                 
63 Id. 
64 This refers to the enemy combatants that disregard the principles of jus in 
bello by failing to distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform and carrying arms 
openly, among other violations. They can be labeled as criminals because they do 
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A.  Trend 1: the Jus ad bellum’s Veneer Over Jus ad bello 
As already outlined and discussed throughout this article, jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello are separable concepts. The public is 
comfortable and familiar with evaluating the merits of a given side in 
an armed conflict; it is a regular part of the political discourse and the 
fundamentals of jus ad bellum are similar to the restrictions on the use 
of force they face in everyday life. Public discourse is a good thing 
and the decision to enter an armed conflict should be widely and 
publicly debated. However, politicians, commentators, jurists, and 
academics then allow this jus ad bellum decision to enter an armed 
conflict to color and affect how they discuss and evaluate the legality 
of the combatant’s acts in jus in bello. The conflation of jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello is both legally and morally problematic.65 The two 
concepts are distinct but can become blurred when the reasons 
behind why a State entered an armed conflict are suspect or without 
merit. 
World War II is a perfect example to compare one State’s 
Soldier with another: the German Soldier and his American 
counterpart. The German Soldier was a product of an evil State. But 
the rules governing the German Soldier in combat are identical to the 
rules that govern the U.S. Soldier in combat. The validity of a jus ad 
bellum claim that a war is unjust is totally irrelevant to the legality of a 
given warlike act of a Soldier. As the Just War Theorist Professor 
Michael Walzer notes, just wars can be fought unjustly and unjust 
                                                 
not possess privileged belligerency and therefore all of their acts of violence, to 
include the killing of uniformed enemy, are subject to criminal prosecution.   
65 This issue has been identified in the DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL: 
“As a general matter, jus in bello and jus ad bellum address different legal issues 
and should not be conflated. Conflating jus in bello and jus ad bellum risks 
misunderstanding and misapplying these concepts. For example, in jus ad bellum, 
proportionality refers to the principle that the overall goal of the State in resorting 
to war should not be outweighed by the harm that the war is expected to produce. 
However, proportionality in jus in bello generally refers to the standard that the 
expected incidental harm to the civilian population and civilian objects should not 
be disproportionate to the anticipated military advantage from an attack. Therefore, 
although a jus ad bellum proportionality analysis might consider the harm suffered by 
enemy military forces in the fighting, a jus in bello proportionality analysis would 
not.” Id. at 3.5.1. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
132 
wars can be fought justly.66 While politics are a necessary part of jus 
ad bellum,67 we should be careful to keep politics from affecting any jus 
in bello legal determinations and adjudication just like we try to keep 
politics out of our domestic criminal law decisions. 
This task is difficult enough without being linked to the 
modern international criminal tribunal whose jurists do not share a 
common polity with the defendant or even with each other. While 
these same conditions existed at Nuremberg, many of those judges 
were military officers fully aware that the decisions they made would 
affect their profession. Conversely, few judges at the international 
tribunals have any military experience.68 This lack of military 
experience is evident in many of our politicians, commentators, 
jurists, and academics; the result is that they tend to be far more 
familiar with and accepting of the criminal law and jus ad bellum goals 
of maintaining the peace rather than the jus in bello mission of rapidly 
ending the war. 
B. Trend 2: The Current Mindset for War: From the Management 
of Violence to the Management of Governance 
The role of the modern military is changing and today’s 
militaries face great uncertainty. New technologies and capabilities to 
inflict harm are not only held by States but are in the hands of non-
State actors.69 In War From the Ground Up, Emily Simpson divides 
modern conflict into two categories: war fought “to establish military 
                                                 
66 WALZER supra note 29, at 21. 
67 For example, the Article 1, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution give the 
power to declare war to the most political of the three branches of the Federal 
Government: Congress. 
68 For a discussion of the cost of a lack of military experience among 
Tribunal judges, see Richard V. Meyer, Following Historical Precedent: An Argument for 
the Continued Use of Military Professionals as Triers of Fact in Some Humanitarian Law 
Tribunals, 7 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 43 (2009). 
69 A byproduct of the post-industrial information age is that the raw 
materials and the knowledge to manufacture or develop potent weapons are both 
readily available to the general populace.   
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conditions for a political solution;”70 and war fought to “directly seek 
political, as opposed to military, outcomes.”71 The Gulf War from 
1990 to 1991 is a modern example of the first type while Afghanistan 
is an example of the second. The reality of having a strategy that 
needs “to consider military actions in terms of their likely political 
interpretations”72 will persist. As Simpson correctly notes, General 
Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2009, restricted the use of 
both indirect fires and air-delivered bombs not because “they are . . . 
effective in military terms; they are. However, their political effect is 
often more harmful than their military value.”73 McChrystal put it in 
more general terms in his tactical directive: “the carefully controlled 
and disciplined employment of force entails risk to our troops – and 
we must mitigate that risk wherever possible. But excessive use of 
force resulting in an alienated population will produce far greater 
risk.”74 The political and the military become blurred: “A policy 
decision only to fight wars with clear military solutions would mean 
to decline involvement in several situations in which enemies, 
especially non-state actors, refuse to engage in conventional battle 
against Western military forces.”75 
In 1957, Professor Samuel Huntington wrote The Soldier and 
the State, in which he outlined what constituted a professional 
Soldier.76 Professor Huntington opined the Soldier’s purpose was 
“the management of violence.”77 But the modern Soldier is asked to 
do much more. Today’s Soldier is asked to manage governance: 
Soldiers build schools, teach judges, manage power plants, grow 
                                                 
70 Sir Michael Howard, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT (Apr. 13, 2013) 
(reviewing ERNIE SIMPSON,’ WAR FROM THE GROUND UP: TWENTY-FRIST-
CENTURY COMBAT AS POLITICS (2013 [hereinafter “Simpson”]). 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 4. 
73 Id. at 234. 
74 Declassified excerpt from NATO’s Tactical Directive, 2 July 2009, 
released by NATO ISAF Headquarters, 6 July 2009. 
75 Howard, supra note 70, at 11 
76 SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE (1957). 
77 Id. at 16. 
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crops.78 Even in non-permissive environments, Soldiers are expected 
to mitigate violence. In concept, mitigating violence is attractive, but 
in practice, the asymmetric enemy is unlikely to give the Soldier any 
indication that he or she is a belligerent. 
One example of this thinking is the U.S. Army and the U.S. 
Marine Corps manual for counterinsurgency (COIN).79 
Understanding the asymmetric reality of both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
the military decided in the mid-2000s to redraft the COIN manual. In 
particular, the situation in Iraq had deteriorated and the insurgency 
was gaining momentum. The manual, published in June 2006, 
acknowledged “[a]t its core, counterinsurgency warfare is a struggle 
for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the 
center of gravity for friendly fire.”80 One of the enumerated 
‘unsuccessful practices’ in the counterinsurgency manual was the 
warning not to place a “priority on killing and capturing the 
enemy. . .”81 The goal instead is to engage and protect the population. 
Counterinsurgency is an example of the second form of 
warfare discussed by Simpson; Counterinsurgency’s core mission is 
to make a political reality happen. This means political factors are 
primary. In the case of Afghanistan, it was the popular legitimacy of 
the government. In the words of Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, 
“[b]roadly stated, modern COIN doctrine stresses the need to protect 
civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and infrastructure, 
and help establish a legitimate and accountable host-nation 
government able to deliver essential human services.”82 
The COIN doctrine allows the use of force, to include lethal 
force, but the entire narrative of the manual is to constrain the use of 
force: 
                                                 
78 Dominic Tierney, Op-Ed., Jefferson’s Army of Nation Builders, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 10, 2010. 
79 Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication 3-33.5, December 2006 [hereinafter “COIN Manual”], at Preface. 
80 Id. at 1.1. 
81 Id. 
82 Karl W. Eikenberry, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan: 
The Other Side of the COIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 59, 63. 
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[a]ny use of force generates a series of 
reactions. . . .the type and amount of force to be 
applied, and who wields it, should be carefully 
calculated by a counterinsurgent for any operation. 
An operation that kills five insurgents is 
counterproductive if the collateral damage or the 
creation of blood feuds leads to the recruitment of 
fifty more.83 
This rationale and logic was clear in the 2011 tactical directive 
of the Commander of ISAF, General John R. Allen, which stated: 
[c]onsider all use of force carefully. Ensure that the 
use of force is necessary and proportionate to the 
threat faced, and when applied it is precisely 
delivered. We must never forget the center of gravity 
in this campaign is the Afghan people; the citizens of 
Afghanistan will ultimately determine the future of 
their country.84 
During the same time frame the COIN concept was being 
developed within the Department of Defense, the Office of the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff enacted a breathtaking change 
to the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE): individual Soldiers no 
longer enjoyed the personal right of self-defense.85 Individual self-
defense became a subset of unit self-defense and exercised by the 
unit commander: “unit commanders may limit individual self-defense 
by members of their unit.”86 The theoretical foundation of individual 
self-defense is premised on three pillars: the force used is necessary; 
the amount of force used is proportional; and the threat is imminent. 
In the previous editions of the SROE, the U.S. recognized each 
                                                 
83 COIN Manual, paragraph 1-141 
84 ISAF Tactical Directive, 30 November 2011, found at 
http://www.rs.nato.int/images/docs/20111105%20nuc%20tactical%20directive%
20revision%204%20(releaseable%20version)%20r.pdf. 
85 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, Standing Rules of 
Engagement, 13 June 2005 at para. E.2.a. 
86 Id. 
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Soldier possessed the “inherent right to use all necessary means 
available and to take appropriate actions to defend oneself. . . .” 87 
The suspension of an individual Soldier’s right of self-defense 
and the ascent of the COIN doctrine are inextricably related; the 
concept of limiting the use of force is woven throughout the 
counterinsurgency manual.88 The suspension and ascent are related by 
time, effect, and circumstances on the ground in both Afghanistan 
and Iraq in 2004 and 2005. There was a conclusion that military 
commanders could not use violence to win the conflict. And the 
COIN doctrine, by its very nature, and the suspension of self-
defense, limits the use of force. 
The COIN doctrine during an insurgency is not ill-advised; 
this doctrine is a legitimate means to execute a war. But the desire to 
limit force has a profound effect on a State’s military. The 
management of violence by the Soldier under COIN is the exception; 
now, under Simpson’s second paradigm, the Soldier is focused on 
managing governance. The military activity is no longer clearly 
distinguishable from the political activity by the Soldier on behalf of 
State. This means we enter a conflict where military violence is 
eschewed. Conditions allowing the use of force to be confined and 
constrained is, however, a policy decision. Counterinsurgency policy 
does not change the law that applies to combatants in conflict. It 
does, however, change the public’s mindset of what war constitutes. 
The public begins to think we can produce results with limited force. 
It then becomes the expectation – especially from the public, via the 
press – that any force which results in a death of an innocent is the 
exception. It drives the public to believe the resultant damage or 
death is the salient factor in considering if a force was justified to 
begin with. 
In other words, civilian criminal law standards start to apply 
to privileged belligerents on the battlefield. Terms like self-defense, 
necessity, and proportionality exist both within criminal law and jus in 
bello. This leads some to think the jus in bello standards imbedded in 
                                                 
87 Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 3121.01A, Standing Rules of 
Engagement, 15 January 2000 at Enclosure A, para. 5.a. 
88 COIN Manual, supra note 79. 
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IHL are the same language: the same concepts and meaning 
extrapolated from civilian criminal law. The media, commentators, 
and even jurists are guilty of this mistake. The fact is, although the 
vocabulary may be similar, the meaning of these terms is tectonically 
different. This category of conflation error has recently arisen within 
the decisions of the international tribunals. 
C. Trend 3: Criminalization of the Use of Force by International 
Courts 
Military objectives are central to the use of violence by a 
military commander. Military objectives are “limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.”89 The sad reality is that civilians, 
who are protected by IHL, will inevitably be in areas of armed 
conflict and exposed to harm. It is therefore universally recognized, 
in the words of Professor Geoffrey Corn, “that the principle of 
military objective is insufficient to provide adequate protection for 
civilians from the harmful effects of hostilities.”90 With this reality in 
mind, military professionals, through customary practice, developed 
the jus in bello principles of distinction and proportionality. These 
were recorded by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions Additional 
Protocol, which prohibits 1) attacks that are intentionally against 
civilians and 2) attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in 
relation to the concrete military objective.91 
The first prohibition is intent based; the second is a balancing 
of military objectives and the civilian casualties and determining if the 
latter was excessive. The first violates the principle of distinction, 
while the second violates the principle of proportionality. Distinction, 
as noted earlier, is the obligation of military personnel to delineate 
                                                 
89 Additional Protocol I, 52(2). 
90 Expert Report of Professor Geoffrey Corn to the ICTY for the case of 
The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-06-90, at 
12. 
91 Additional Protocol I, 48 & 51(5)(b). 
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between combatants and civilians. Proportionality is a much more 
ambiguous concept because it is subjective; proportionality is 
violated, in essence, when it is determined that the harm to civilians 
was excessive to the concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated from attacking a lawful military objective. Professor Jens 
David Ohlin of Cornell University concludes, “that there are almost 
no examples of [proportionality-based] prosecutions before 
international tribunals that might provide guiding precedent on the 
nature of proportionality.”92 Professor Ohlin maintains that 
proportionality “has so rarely been applied by international tribunals” 
because prosecutors “squeeze almost all of the targeting cases into 
the first [prong], thus accusing the commander in question of directly 
targeting civilians. . . .”93   
Outlining a series of cases with the International Tribunal of 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Professor Ohlin concludes the 
common law concept of intent—acting with purpose or 
knowledge—required under the first prong of intentionally attacking 
civilians within the ICTY has morphed to the lower standard of 
recklessness. In other words, the court never has to grapple with the 
murky world of proportionality found in the second prong. The case 
that crystallizes this lower standard is The Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar.94  
In Strugar, the defendant, Lieutenant General Strugar, was a 
leader in the then Yugoslav Peoples’ Army.95 The Yugoslav 
government, in an attempt to hold Yugoslavia together, was 
attempting to suppress the Croatian people from breaking away.96 As 
part of this suppression, General Strugar shelled areas of Dubrovnik, 
Croatia in late 1991.97 These artillery attacks killed several civilians 
                                                 
92 Jens David Ohlin, Targeting and the Concept of Intent, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 79 
at 86 [hereinafter “Ohlin”]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. citing Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Chamber 
Judgment, Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Jan. 31, 2005), 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/tjug/en/str-tj050131e.pdf. [hereinafter 
“Strugar”]. 
95 Id. at 1. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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and destroyed many historic buildings.98 The defendant was charged 
with murder and the intentional attacks on civilians. He was found 
guilty and sentenced to eight years.99 The Trial Chamber held: 
. . . where a civilian population is subject to an attack 
such as an artillery attack, which results in civilian 
deaths, such deaths may appropriately be 
characterized as murder, when the perpetrators had 
knowledge of the probability that the attack would cause 
death.100 
The mere probability the attack would cause death is enough 
to trigger a charge of an intentional harming of civilians. The concept 
of intent—acting with either purpose or knowledge—under Strugar 
expanded to recklessness. This lower standard means a commander 
who launches an attack where there is a probability civilians might be 
injured or killed is violating IHL; in other words, the commander 
launching the attack is a war criminal because of mere probability and 
the accompanying result that the harm occurred. In war, it would be 
hard to fathom a situation where harm might not befall the civilian 
population, especially in an age of asymmetric warfare where the 
enemy refuses to distinguish himself from the civilian population. 
What is occurring is that the law is being driven by the 
results, not the intent. War causes death and destruction and some of 
those harmed will be civilians. To minimize those losses is of 
paramount import, but to make the standard of culpability one of 
recklessness subject to an after-the-fact review is to impose an 
unrealistic limitation on the military. And conceptually, it flips IHL 
on its head. Professor Ohlin states the conceptual underpinnings of 
IHL: “envisioning the killing of civilians and coming to some 
conclusion as to whether the number of deaths will be proportionate 
or not disproportionate – does not violate the principle of 
distinction. Simply envisioning the deaths of civilians does not mean 
the commander has directed the attack against the civilians.”101 If that 
                                                 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 198. 
100 Id. at 110. 
101 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 113. 
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were the case, no Soldier would be immune from the reality that in 
war civilians will be killed and thereby making Soldiers criminally 
liable to this reality. 
Even the mental element in Article 30 of the Rome Statute of 
1998—the Statute that established the International Criminal Court 
(ICC)—states “[u]nless otherwise provided, a person shall be 
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court [ICC] only in the material elements are 
committed with intent and knowledge.”102 A plain reading of Article 
30 seems to suggest the defendant must act with purpose or 
knowledge to be culpable. In fact, recklessness as a standard to meet 
culpability was considered by the drafters of the Rome Statute and 
squarely rejected: the mental element of recklessness was banished 
from the Statute.103 Put differently, even if an accused foresees the 
possibility of his or her act causing death and still persists, regardless of 
the possible consequences, the person is not guilty of a war crime 
unless the accused had knowledge civilians would be killed and he or 
she meant to kill those civilians.   
But some judges and commentators cite Article 30 and the 
“unless otherwise provided” clause to conclude recklessness is 
enough to find culpability. Recklessness, they argue, is a level of 
intent that is an acceptable standard under customary international 
law and therefore, otherwise provided; that is, it is an acceptable 
mental state for war crimes.104 Professor Ohlin notes, however, “it is 
not clear how customary international law could provide a basis to 
support a lower mental element.”105 This revisionist interpretation of 
what Article 30 means is critical because it changes the focus from 
what the Soldier thinks will happen to what an objective person 
thinks might happen. Those are two starkly different perspectives. The 
former is a mental state possessed by the Soldier when he uses force, 
while the latter is about the degree of risk the Soldier takes. Any 
military mission will have risks that the Soldier’s acts could cause the 
                                                 
102 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (entered into force 
July 1, 2002) at Article 30 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”]. 
103 Id.; Ohlin supra note 92, at 101. 
104 Strugar, supra note 94, at 110. 
105 Ohlin, supra note 92, at 108. 
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death of a civilian – if that is the acid test, however, then any mission 
will be judged under the first prong of willfully targeting civilians. 
Under this analysis, the courts approach a strict liability: the dead 
civilian is presumptively a war crime. 
The courts’ decisions and even the far better justified opinion 
of Professor Ohlin both make the same conflation error; attempting 
to use traditional criminal law concepts to explain terms in jus in bello. 
Professor Ohlin falls for the trap of using the common law definition 
of intentional (including purpose and knowledge) to define the term 
within the Protocol and opening this door invites the subsequent step 
down to recklessness. This first prong actually has two parts: A) who 
or what was targeted, and B) were they or it a legitimate military 
target? 
Part A is entirely subjective. Who were you targeting? 
Combatants are prohibited from conducting indiscriminate attacks. 
Instead, each attack must have a specific legitimate military target. 
Thus, for the first prong, the standard is that of motivated purpose. 
As the then Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
noted, “International humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit 
belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against military 
objectives even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries 
will occur.”106 To use any other standard would be to completely 
eliminate the principle of proportionality. That principle forces the 
attacker to balance the military advantage with the collateral damage, 
meaning the attacker has knowledge a civilian target will be damaged 
and yet can still strike if the military advantage outweighs the 
collateral cost. The crux is who or what did they plan for the 
projectile to hit? 
For part B, if the target was a valid military target, this part 
has not been violated even if the strike (knowingly) killed dozens of 
innocent civilians collaterally, though this would probably violate the 
second prong of proportionality. More problematic is if the shooter 
                                                 
106 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, letter concerning the situation in Iraq, Office of 
the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, February 9, 2006, p. 5, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February
_2006.pdf. 
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subjectively believed the target to be a valid military target, but in fact 
it was not. For example, Captain Kudo shot the two diggers on the 
side of the road in Afghanistan believing they were planting a bomb, 
but afterwards we determine they were only digging an irrigation 
canal. It is in this second prong that a level of intent less than 
purpose might be appropriate. On a static battlefield (e.g., trench 
warfare) segregated from the civilian population, it might be 
justifiable to issue an order to shoot anything moving in the no man’s 
land between the trenches since there is little or no chance it is a 
civilian and taking the time to verify it is an enemy may place the 
Soldier at risk. This would be in contrast to a modern asymmetric 
nonlinear global battlefield. Given these opposite poles of possibility 
and correlative responsibility, the sliding scales of recklessness or 
negligence seem to provide the best vehicle to balance the myriad of 
factors and concerns. However, post hoc evaluation of any such 
decision must give full credence to the factual situation for that 
belligerent: would a reasonable privileged belligerent with the 
knowledge, training, time, resources, and experience of the defendant 
have believed the target was lawful? Note this does not open the door 
to question if the attack was tactically required at that time under this 
prong, but only if the belief of the shooter that the target was a 
military target was reasonable under the circumstances. 
On at least one occasion, the ICTY grappled with the second 
prong: attacks that produce excessive civilian casualties in relation to 
the concrete military objective. In the case of The Prosecutor v. Ante 
Gotovina, et al.107, Colonel General Ante Gotovina, a Croatian 
commander, was indicted for ordering an illegal artillery attack 
against four towns—Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac.108 Each 
city was in the Croatian Serb break-away region of Krajina. Croatia 
launched an offensive—Operation Storm—in 1995 to bring this 
region back under Croatian control. The Croatian forces commenced 
to put the towns of Knin, Obrovac, Gracic and Benkovac under 
fire.109 The objective of Operation Storm was to expel Serbian forces 
from the region. The Croatian forces succeeded under General 
                                                 
107 The Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan Cermak and Mladen Markac, IT-
06-90 [hereinafter “Gotovina”]. 
108 Id. at 9. 
109 Id. at 601. 
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Gotovina; they seized Knin, the capital of Krajina, on August 5, 
1995.110 
The Tribunal’s indictment of General Gotovina for violations 
of the laws and customs of war hinged on his shelling of the four 
towns. The Trial Chamber found General Gotovina guilty of 
violating these laws and customs. As one academic concluded, 
“Gotovina’s conviction turns on the lawfulness vel non of the 
artillery fires against targets in the[se] Krajina towns. . . .”111 
The Trial Court’s judgment of Gotovina appears to be 
premised on both prongs of liability: the attacks were intentional (i.e., 
deliberately toward civilians), and the attacks were indiscriminate (i.e., 
an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian 
life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination 
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and 
direct military advantage anticipated).112 As Major General Walter B. 
Huffman, the former Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army, 
noted, “the court apparently embraced a hybrid theory of both 
deliberate and indiscriminate targeting in violation of Protocol I, 
Articles 51(2) and 51(5)(a).113 Under Article 51(2), the first prong—
”civilians [] shall not be the object of attack”—Gotovina “deliberately 
targeted civilian areas.”114 Under Article 51(5), the second prong—the 
balancing of the military advantage gained to the amount and severity 
of civilian casualties —Gotovina’s shelling “constituted an 
indiscriminate attack on these towns. . .”115 
Both prongs are premised on an inference that shells that 
landed more than 200 meters from a known military objective were 
deemed unlawful (deliberate or indiscriminate) attacks on civilian 
                                                 
110 Id. 
111 Walter B. Huffman, Margin of Error: Potential Pitfalls of the Ruling in the 
Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, 211 MIL. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012) [hereinafter “Huffman”]. 
112 ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 12; Additional 
Protocol I, Art. 51(5)(b). 
113 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28. 
114 Gotovina, supra note 107, at 973 
115 Huffman, supra note 111, at 28. 
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areas.116 With little evidentiary support, the Trial Chamber concluded 
“a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that those artillery 
projectiles which impacted within a distance of 200 meters of 
identified artillery targets were deliberately fired at that artillery 
target.”117 The court then extrapolated from this norm that any 
projectile falling outside the 200-meter range was disproportionate.118 
The Trial Chamber’s decree of a 200-meter rule—without 
receiving any evidence on this point—is deeply troubling: “the court 
had to make broad assumptions, treat the absence of evidence as 
evidence of absence, and resolve ambiguities in favor of the 
prosecution to be able to apply its 200 meter standard.”119 The logic 
in the Gotovina case extends the trend outlined by Professor Olin that 
the threshold of liability is lowered, but in this case, it goes to the 
second prong. International Tribunals’ attempt to shoehorn all 
civilian deaths into an intentional act, even if reckless, under the first 
prong (the military commander knew there would be civilians 
casualties), is driven by the prosecutor’s theory of the case. Opening 
the aperture to recklessness is concerning and fraught with dangers. 
In essence, the court’s focus is on the post-hoc effects of the 
military’s attack instead of what is required by IHL; that commanders 
act in good faith to do all within their capabilities and limitations to 
minimize civilian casualties while accomplishing their mission.120 The 
Gotovina Court, however, introduces a per se rule into the subjectivity 
of proportionality. The court dictates that since the commander 
exceeded the 200-meter rule, he is per se excessive under the second 
prong. 
When triggering a per se rule, an international tribunal never 
has to contend with the commander’s intent and examine his good-
faith precautions to spare innocence. Like reducing intentionality to 
mere recklessness, the court sidestepped the rigorous balancing 
                                                 
116 Gotovina, supra note 107 (Summary at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/tjug/en/110415_summary.pdf). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Huffman, supra note 111, at 36. 
120 ICRC Commentary on International Humanitarian Law, note 22 at para. 
2215. 
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analysis required under the principle of proportionality. Instead, the 
Gotovina Court relied on a strict liability of violating some abstract 
rule of distance to find liability. To abandon this balancing test is 
problematic to say the least. 
As General Huffman concludes, “[a] hallmark of international 
humanitarian law is its consistency with the actual practice of warfare 
by civilized nations.”121 The court’s per se 200-meter rule, made out 
of whole cloth, alters the timeframe to be examined; in other words, 
the moment in time for consideration is shifted from the time of 
attack to the time the collateral damage occurs. This is contrary to 
IHL in that the question of whether the commander killed or injured 
civilians becomes the locus of judgment instead of examining the 
commander’s military necessity at the time of attack. Even the 
commentary to the Additional Protocols acknowledges that under the 
second prong, when determining if the harm to civilians is excessive 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from an 
attack of a lawful military objective, the perspective to be examined is 
the military commander’s before the attack.122 It is the prosecution’s 
obligation under the customs and laws of war to show there was a 
criminal intent by the commander when he ordered the attack. The 
destructive results are evidence but nothing in the law requires, nor 
should it, the results be the driver. It is the commander’s intent at the 
time. 
The Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber’s 
conviction and found the 200-meter rule to be arbitrary; it further 
concluded the civilian casualties were not excessive compared to the 
military advantage from shelling the four towns.123 As one military 
and artillery expert opined, “I can state unequivocally that a circle of 
200 m[eters] around a target could never serve as a realistic or proper 
                                                 
121 Huffman, supra note 111, at 45. 
122 Commentary to the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions at 
pp. 683,684. 
123 Prosecutor v. Gotovina et al., Case No. IT-06-90-A, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov.. 16, 2012) at 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/acjug/en/121116_judgement.pdf at pp. 
19-21. 
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standard for a sound assessment of cannon and rocket fire. . . .”124 
Although set aside, the Gotovina Trial Court opened the door for 
international tribunals to stitch new rules out of whole cloth that 
impose criminal liability on commanders. As General Gotovina’s 
appeal correctly asserts the judgment “has far-reaching significance 
beyond [his] case. . . . The Judgment is an unreasonable and 
unrealistic precedent that undermines that credibility and relevance of 
[international] humanitarian law. It imposes a standard so exacting 
that it renders lawful warfare impossible for military commanders.”125 
Professor Corn submitted an expert report before the trial 
court and in subsequent writings opined that the Tribunal was left 
with differing opinions on the reasonableness of General Gotovina’s 
judgment.126 Professor Corn’s concern is that the International 
Tribunal seemed to base its reasonableness of Gotovina’s actions on 
an assessment of whether a commander considered evidence in 
support of his decision.127 But this should not be the standard in a 
criminal proceeding for reasonableness. Instead, the gravamen of the 
proceedings should be “on the quality of the evidence that supported 
the [commander’s] decision.”128 In a nutshell, Professor Corn makes 
the point that, “[i]nstead of focusing on the question of whether the 
commander reasonably believed the object of attack was a military 
objective, the Tribunal has focused on the question of whether the 
commander knew the object of attack was a civilian or civilian 
property.”129 
The reality is that any criminal judgment of a Soldier using 
force will be after the fact—post hoc. The test must be one of 
                                                 
124 Huffman citing Comments and Conclusions by GenMaj (ret.) Rolf Th. 
Ocken, German Army, on the Subject “Croatian Army use of Artillery in KNIN, 
CROATIA on 4-5 August 1995,” (Nov. 19, 2011). 
125 Notice of Appeal of Ante Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, May 16, 
2011, found at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/gotovina/custom6/en/110516.pdf at 
pp 4-5.  
126 Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgement, and a Proposed Quantum of 
Information Component: A Fourth Amendment Lesson in Contextual Reasonableness, 77 
Brook. L. Rev. 437, 456-457. 
127 Id. at 458. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Maxwell & Meyer 5:1 
147 
reasonableness, but the analysis should start with what information 
did the commander have at the time? Professor Corn was “struck by 
the inherent arbitrariness of [the court’s] assessment.”130 Professor 
Corn writes, “[w]hile it seemed relatively apparent that the Presiding 
Judge was determined to critique the reasonableness of General 
Gotovina’s judgments by carefully considering all the facts and 
circumstances prevailing at the time, there was never any discussion 
of the amount of proof required to render those judgments 
reasonable.”131 
This lack of standard will inevitably drive a judicial appraisal 
to make determinations on what occurred after the fact vice the 
considerations and deliberations of the Soldier before the fact. The 
real question is: do the military actions have a reasonable basis in 
military necessity? The presumption must be yes. To presume 
otherwise would lead to the post hoc critiquing of a commander’s 
actions based on what occurred, instead of the commander’s intent as 
expressed by his orders. 
D. Trend 4: Revising Jus in bello Without Considering the Effect on 
the Innocent Warfighter 
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary 
practice. Professional warfighters with battlefield experience have 
balanced humanitarian goals with the moral and legal mandate to end 
the conflict as quickly as possible and the rights and respect owed the 
individual warfighter to create the principles of jus in bello. By 
developing through customary practice, these principles were able to 
evolve without threatening the military mission or unjustly 
victimizing the warfighter. The battlefield is so dissimilar to everyday 
life because its denizens operate outside the protections of the law. 
The battlefield is not the place for external academic, untested, new-
idea-driven change. Sadly, this has not dissuaded some from 
attempting exactly that. 
                                                 
130 Id. at 457. 
131 Id. 
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In 2009, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) sent a shock wave across the international legal community. 
The ICRC published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law. In this Interpretive Guidance, written by Nils Melzer, the 
following recommendation was proposed: 
Restraint on the use of force in direct attack 
In addition to the restraints imposed by international 
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of 
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions 
that may arise under other applicable branches of 
international law, the kind and degree of force which 
is permissible against persons not entitled to 
protection against direct attack must not exceed what 
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate 
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.132 
It was the phrase “must not exceed what is actually 
necessary”133 that caused the firestorm. The ICRC recommended a 
use-of-force continuum theory, or as some academics refer to it, the 
‘least harmful means rule.’ In the Interpretive Guidance, the ICRC 
goes on to explain what it meant by necessary: 
[i]n sum, while operating forces can hardly be 
required to take additional risks for themselves or the 
civilian population in order to capture an armed 
adversary alive, it would defy basic notions of 
humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving 
him or her an opportunity to surrender where there 
manifestly is no necessity for the use of lethal force.134 
                                                 
132 ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, adopted February 26, 2009. at 
996. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1043. 
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The footnote substantiating this claim quotes the writings of 
Jean Pictet, once the President of the ICRC and the lead editor of the 
authoritative commentary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Pictet 
opined: “[i]f we can put a Soldier out of action by capturing him, we 
should not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding 
him, we must not kill him. . . .”135 
Other academics have also advanced a ‘least harmful means 
rule.’ Professor Goodman of New York University used the ICRC 
Interpretive Guidance as a springboard to argue a ‘least harmful 
means rule,’ “should be understood to have a solid foundation in the 
structure, rules, and practices of modern warfare.”136 His argument is 
grounded in Article 41(2) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I, which 
mandates the safeguarding of hors de combat—those combatants 
outside the fight.137 Goodman argues, like the Interpretive Guidance, 
“a Soldier who is rendered defenseless or incapable of resistance 
should not be subject to attack.”138 He expands the conceptual 
definition of hors de combat and argues an enemy combatant should 
be treated like a hors de combat when “there is clearly no military 
benefit (including any risk to one’s own forces) to be gained from 
killing rather than capturing an individual.”139 This includes situations 
where the enemy combatant could still physically engage in hostilities 
but does not. Like the Interpretive Guidance, Professor Goodman 
suggests that considerations of military necessity and humanity 
should guide the determination of how to conduct an engagement.140 
His theoretical basis for abandoning the well-entrenched rule that 
members of an enemy belligerency qualify as lawful objects of attack 
at all times and all places for as long as they remain under the 
operational command and control of enemy leadership and are 
physically capable of acting on that authority141 is to limit the scope of 
                                                 
135 Id. at 1044 
136 Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J. 
INT’L .L. 819 (2013) [hereinafter “Goodman”]. 
137 Id. & Additional Protocol 1, Art. 85(3). 
138 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830. 
139 Id. at 839. 
140 Id. 
141 Geoffrey S. Corn, Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, 
Belligerent Targeting and the Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 
536, 538 (2013) [hereinafter “Corn et al.”]. 
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military necessity.142 In other words, an enemy belligerent who would 
do no harm; that is, defenseless, is not militarily necessary to kill. 
Other academics echo this conclusion: 
[T]he current interpretation of ‘necessary’ as including 
what is less costly or less risky or even merely 
convenient allows too broad a discretion for forces to 
attack available—rather than clearly ‘necessary’—
targets. To bring the term ‘necessary’ closer to its 
literal meaning, it should include a least-harmful 
means component; it is entirely possible to conceive 
of ‘necessary’ as the least measure of harm by which 
to achieve a desired end.143 
The challenges with the ICRC’s rationale, along with the 
scholarship of Professor Goodman, are fourfold. First, there is 
absolutely no requirement under state practice or international law, 
namely the 1977 Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions, for 
a combatant to do a ‘military necessity’ analysis of an enemy 
belligerent; the Soldier need not to look to a ‘least harmful means 
rule’ as to whether the Soldier should capture the enemy belligerent 
or kill him. Given that military necessity “justifies those measures not 
forbidden by international law which are indispensable for securing 
the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible,”144 killing 
an enemy belligerent is per se permissible. The enemy belligerent takes 
a status under IHL of being a military target. The rationale is simple: 
“military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed 
enemies.”145 As noted Law of War expert Hays Parks concluded, 
“[t]here is no ‘military necessity’ determination requirement for an 
individual Soldier to engage an enemy combatant or a civilian 
                                                 
142 Goodman, supra note 136, at 830. 
143 Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 
161 (2011). 
144 See Note 25. 
145 W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: 
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 804 
(2010) [hereinafter “Parks”]. 
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determined to be taking a direct part in hostilities, any more than 
there is for a Soldier to attack an enemy tank.”146 
The second challenge is one of shifting burdens. Under 
current international law, the burden is on the enemy belligerent to 
indicate his surrender affirmatively. This assumes the enemy 
belligerent is not a hors de combat—”rendered unconscious or is 
otherwise incapacitated by wounds or sickness, and therefore is 
incapable of defending himself.”147 Professor Michael Schmitt of the 
Naval War College makes the point, “[a] rule that prohibits an attack 
whenever the individual can be captured would shift the burden from 
the fighter to the attacker in a way that warfighting states would have 
been, and remain, unlikely to countenance.”148 These States would 
not adhere to such a shift in burden because it would add a layer of 
complexity to military operations—training, implementation, 
accountability—that is simply unsustainable. The reality is, “the 
historic consequence of combat is that combatants lawfully may kill 
their enemies and are at constant risk of being killed by them.”149 
Related to the shifting burden States would eschew, the third 
troubling point about the ICRC’s proposal is its lack of practicality. 
In the words of Professors Geoffrey Corn, Laurie Blank, Chris Jenks, 
and Eric Talbot Jensen: 
once the law requires that Soldiers assess the actual 
threat an enemy combatant poses, the inevitable 
consequence of a rule that requires less harmful 
means based on the absence of an actual threat, the 
effectiveness of combat capability risks dilution, and 
tactical clarity will be degraded. . . . [and] [d]iluting 
tactical clarity will inevitably dilute . . . moral clarity.150 
                                                 
146 Id. 
147 Additional Protocol 1, Art. 41. 
148 Michael N. Schmitt, Wound, Capture, or Kill: A Reply to Ryan Goodman’s 
‘The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants’, 24 EUR. J. INT’L .L.  855, 858 (2013). 
149 Parks, supra note 145, at 829. 
150 Corn et al., supra note 141, at 567-568. 
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Once the element of subjectivity enters the equation, moral 
clarity—whether it is at the tactical, operational, or strategic level—
exits. Professors Corn, Blank, Jenks, and Jensen make a compelling 
case that not giving the Soldier the clarity of whether he can engage 
and shoot an enemy belligerent will result in hesitation, confusion, or 
create a chilling effect on what the Soldier is asked to do: engage with 
and destroy the enemy. The second-guessing with the benefit of 
20/20 hindsight will cripple a Soldier’s certainty that when he 
engages with the enemy, his mission, as has been the mission of 
Soldiers for centuries before him, is to kill the enemy. And “the 
assurance and knowledge that the always difficult decision to take 
another human life was legally and operationally justified. . . .”151 is 
critical to a Soldier’s mental and moral compass. The authors of this 
article go one step further: the ‘least harmful means rule’ would 
eviscerate moral clarity in the fog of war. 
The fourth concern is that the ‘least harmful means rule’ is 
actually the conflation of two legal regimes: IHL and domestic law 
norms outlined within human rights law (HRL). Under HRL, known 
as the law enforcement regime, the use of lethal force is one of last 
resort. When a law enforcement officer has reasonable alternatives, 
he or she must exercise them. The criminal suspect in a domestic 
context never takes a status of a military target; in laymen’s speak, the 
criminal cannot be killed merely because of what he is suspected of 
having done criminally. The compact in the law enforcement 
paradigm is “to protect individuals from abuse by their State”152 of 
which the suspect is a member. And when lethal force is used in the 
domestic setting, it must be necessary, proportional, and imminent; 
that is, the officer triggers a right of self-defense for himself or others 
in the vicinity. 
In the U.S. context, the Supreme Court has held that the use 
of deadly force is reasonable under the Constitution and therefore 
authorized when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect 
                                                 
151 Id. at 620. 
152 ICRC, The Use of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay between the 
Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms at 7, found at 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf [hereinafter 
“Interplay”]. 
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is dangerous and can escape and a verbal warning, if feasible, is 
given.153 On the other side of the equation, the Court has held that 
“[w]here a suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no 
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him 
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”154 It is the 
criminal’s conduct that will drive the actions of the police officer. 
The moral compact of the officer with the society they serve is the 
basis for their authority: “human rights law regulates the resort to 
force by State authorities in order to maintain or restore public 
security, law and order.”155 Minimum force or a ‘least harmful means 
rule’ in this context makes sense—lethal force is a measure of last 
resort because of what the police officer is entrusted to accomplish. 
This is not the logic behind IHL. The driving force behind 
IHL is not to ensure public security, although that could be one the 
military’s tasks; the main goal is to set parameters for Soldiers as 
agents of the State on how to destroy the enemy. The cardinal rule of 
the combatant is distinction—”parties to an armed conflict must at 
all times distinguish between civilians and civilian objects on the one 
hand, and combatants and military objectives on the other hand and 
direct their attacks only against the latter.”156 Given this limitation on 
the use of force, the Soldier, as an agent of the State, is told by the 
State how to accomplish the goal of destroying the combatants and 
military objectives. The use of force to accomplish the mission is 
driven by the State. This collective action by the State uses the Soldier 
to effectuate this goal because the State tells the Soldier what are the 
policy limits of ‘military necessity’ to accomplish the mission. The 
role and purpose of the police officer is fundamentally different, and 
it is why the law enforcement paradigm is troubling in an armed 
conflict scenario. 
                                                 
153 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985). 
154 Id. 
155 Interplay, supra note 152, at 7. 
156 See note 33. 
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E. Trend 5: Challenging the Use of Force by the Military in Civil 
Courts that Lack Subject Matter Competence 
Scholars and international organizations that would make it 
more difficult for Soldiers to engage the enemy are but one prong of 
the trend against the use of military force. The other prongs stem 
from the legal profession: one of those prongs is the access litigants 
have to the courtroom to challenge decisions made by military 
personnel. The civil litigation exposure prong is best evidenced by a 
string of recent cases emerging from the United Kingdom. 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), drafted in 1950, states signatories “shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in . . . this 
Convention.”157 The Convention, in its first substantive article, 
Article 2, outlines a central pillar of human rights law: the right to 
life.158 The Convention mandates that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall 
be protected by law.”159 It does, however, give its signatories a caveat: 
“[d]eprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in 
contravention of this article when it results from the use of force 
which is not more than absolutely necessary. . . .”160 To judicially 
enforce these rights and freedoms, the convention established a 
court: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).161 This court, 
which virtually all European countries have ratified, to include the 
UK, can and has trumped the rulings of domestic courts. 
The real battle line of when States have violated one’s right to 
life has been the elasticity of the concept of jurisdiction; in other 
words, does the right to life provision contained in Article 2—or any 
other provision within the Convention, for that matter—have 
extraterritorial application outside Europe? Of particular import is 
whether this human rights norm applies to conflict areas like 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In late 2001, the case of Bankovic et al. v. Belgium 
et al was brought before the ECtHR by six citizens from the Federal 
                                                 
157 Article 1, European Convention on Human Rights (2010). 
158 Id. at Article 2. 
159 Id. at Art. 2(1). 
160 Id. at Art. 2(2). 
161 Id. at Art. 19-51. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Maxwell & Meyer 5:1 
155 
Republic of Yugoslavia against 17 European members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).162 The claim flowed from 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force. This operation was an air campaign 
directed at Yugoslavia in an effort to force Yugoslavia to remove its 
forces from Kosovo.163 In the morning raid of April 23, 1999, NATO 
bombs killed and injured scores of Yugoslavians.164 The claimants, 
whose relatives died, alleged a violation of the right to life under 
Article 2.165 The question for the ECtHR was whether there was 
jurisdiction to allow the case to go forward. The ECtHR said 
individuals killed by missiles or bombs fired from an aircraft outside 
an area under the effective control of a State were not within the 
State’s jurisdiction.166 
The defendants in the Bankovic Case, the 17 NATO States, 
argued that the term “jurisdiction” meant an “assertion or exercise of 
legal authority, actual or purported, over persons owing some form 
of allegiance to that State or who have been brought within that 
State’s control.”167 The ECtHR seemed to agree. It proclaimed that 
“the jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial.”168 
The Court went on to articulate that “Article 1 of the Convention 
must be considered to reflect this ordinary and essentially territorial 
notion of jurisdiction, other bases of jurisdiction being exceptional 
and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case.”169 If extra-territorial jurisdiction was to exist, then the 
State must militarily occupy or exercise all or some of the public 
powers normally to be exercised by that territory’s government.170 
                                                 
162 Bankovic, Stojanovic, Stoimedovski, Joksimovic and Sukovic v. Belgium, 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the 
United Kingdom, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001), available at 41 I.L.M. 
517 [hereinafter “Bankovic v. Belgium”]. 
163 Id. at pp 518-519. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 522. 
166 Id. at pp. 523-524. 
167 Id. at 522. 
168 Id. at 526. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 528. 
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In other words, a fair reading of Bankovic is that the 
Convention’s extraterritorial jurisdiction must be exceptional. 
Professor Marko Milanovic of the University of Nottingham, 
however, traces the ECtHR’s slow abandonment of this norm.171 In 
2007, for example, the ECtHR in Pad and others v. Turkey found 
jurisdiction when an Iranian family living near the Turkish-Iranian 
border was killed by a missile.172 It was disputed where the attack 
occurred but “the Court clearly thought that it would have been 
entirely arbitrary for the application of the [European Court of 
Human Rights] to hinge on the applicants’ location within a few 
hundred metres.”173 
Ten years after Bankovic, the ECtHR heard the case of Al-
Skeini v. United Kingdom.174 In Al-Skeini, six Iraqis brought suit against 
the United Kingdom. The six claimants asserted the British failed to 
conduct a full and thorough investigation into the deaths of their 
family members; this, they maintained, was a procedural violation of 
Article 2, the right to life.175 Five of the dead Iraqis died in fire fights 
with the British troops. According to the British Government, British 
troops were patrolling the streets of Basra one evening in August 
2003 when they heard gunfire. As the Soldiers approached the 
gunfire, the patrol leader saw several Iraqi men, including Mr. Al-
Skeini, with weapons; one of the Iraqi men pointed his weapon at 
him and his unit. In self-defense, the British Soldier shot and killed 
the Iraqi men. A subsequent investigation found that the Soldiers’ 
actions were a valid exercise of self-defense.176 The Iraqi testimony is 
starkly different: the British Soldiers killed the Iraqis without 
provocation and the reason one of the deceased Iraqis had a weapon 
was because he was walking to a funeral and discharge of weapons at 
                                                 
171 Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L 
.L.  121 (2012) [hereinafter “Milanovic Al-Skeini”]. 
172 Id. at 124. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 121. 
175 Id. at 125. 
176 ECtHR, Al-Skeini et al. v. UK, App. No. 55721/07,7, 7 July 2011 at para. 
34-62. 
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funerals is common.177 In other words, the Iraqis maintained that 
those killed never threatened the British Soldiers. 
The sixth claimant in Al-Skeini drew the most scrutiny. Like 
the other claimants, Mr. Baha Mousa’s father, on behalf of his son, 
claimed that there had been an inadequate investigation. For Mr. 
Mousa, however, is was for the asphyxiation death of Mr. Mousa in a 
British detainment facility in Basra.178 
The British House of Lords dismissed the claims of the five 
Iraqis involved in the firefight.179 The majority applied an “effective 
control” test. The United Kingdom never exercised effective control 
over Basra, even though the British were an occupying power in 
Basra and southern Iraq. The insurgency and the limited number of 
British troops made effective control in Basra not possible. The Law 
Lords cited Bankovic for the notion that the mere killing of an 
individual does not trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction.180 The House 
of Lords did find jurisdiction regarding the death of Baha Mousa, but 
on the grounds that a British prison was like an embassy and 
jurisdiction attached.181 
The question before the ECtHR was what does “within their 
jurisdiction” mean: when and where do the obligations outlined in 
the ECHR—specifically the right to life under Article 2—apply? The 
ECtHR, in essence, expanded Bankovic and opened the jurisdictional 
aperture as follows: 
. . . following the removal from power of the Ba’ath 
regime and under the accession of the Interim 
Government, the United Kingdom (together with the 
United States) assumed in Iraq the exercise of some 
of the public power normally to be exercised by a 
sovereign government. In particular, the United 
                                                 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at paras. 63-71. 
179 R (on the application of Al-Skeini and others) v. Secretary of State for 
Defense (2007) UKHL (2008) AC 153. 
180 Id. at para. 83. 
181 Id. at paras. 97 & 132. 
DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2017 
2017 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:1 
158 
Kingdom assumed authority and responsibility for the 
maintenance of security in South East Iraq. In these 
exceptional circumstances, the Court considers that 
the United Kingdom, through its Soldiers engaged in 
security operations in Basrah during the period in 
question, exercised authority and control over 
individuals killed in the course of such security 
operations, so as to establish a jurisdictional link 
between the deceased and the United Kingdom for 
the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.182 
This holding is extraordinarily expansive and can be read to 
mean that when there are boots-on-the-ground Soldiers conducting 
security operations, the reach of the ECTHR will extend to that 
battlefield. Every army has “public power.” One principle mission of 
a Soldier is to engage in security operations, especially in light of 
COIN operations. The Al-Skeini Case extends jurisdiction, allowing 
individual claimants to challenge the conduct of how the military 
conducts its operations. This ability to second-guess a military’s 
operations will have profound impact on how a nation’s military 
conducts its operations worldwide. But there are second and third 
order effects, as well. The United Kingdom felt the brunt of Al-Skeini 
in two ways: one tactical and one strategic. The claims were allowed 
to go forward, costing the British Government a handsome sum of 
money. But more fundamentally, it opened the floodgate of claimants 
that would challenge how the British Army does business on the 
battlefield. This second point was acutely realized with the case of 
Smith (No. 2) v. The Ministry of Defence.183 
The facts of Smith are chilling both factually and legally—in 
large measure because the claimants are members of the British 
military.184 The claimants alleged a violation of Article 2—right to life. 
They claimed the equipment they were provided while deployed to 
Iraq was not suitable.185 On 15 July 2005, a British squad-sized unit 
                                                 
182 Note 171 at paras. 143-148. 
183 R (on the application of Smith and others) v. Secretary of State for 
Defense (2013) UKSC 41. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at paras. 9-12. 
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patrolled Al Amarah in Iraq. The vehicle used by the patrol was a 
“Snatch Land Rover.” This vehicle had not been fitted with an 
electronic countermeasure to protect it from improvised explosive 
devises, known as IEDs. While on patrol, the Snatch Land Rover hit 
an IED; three Soldiers died and two were injured. Seven months 
later, in the same town, another Snatch Land Rover hit an IED and 
two more Soldiers lost their lives. The second vehicle had been 
outfitted with an electronic countermeasure, but there was a part 
missing to the system and therefore it did not work.186 
The families of the fallen Soldiers sued Her Majesty’s 
Government, asserting that the Ministry of Defence breached the 
right to life under the ECtHR because the government neglected its 
duty for care. The government’s legal defense centered on combat 
immunity.187 This legal concept, developed through case law, stands 
for the proposition that “while the armed forces are in the course of 
actually operating against the enemy, they are under no ‘actionable’ 
duty of care as defined by common law to avoid causing loss or 
damage to their fellow Soldiers, or indeed to anyone who may be 
affected by what they do.”188 
The UK Supreme Court did not agree. The salient issue 
before the Court was whether the European Convention on Human 
Rights applies extraterritorially to protect British troops abroad, to 
include in combat areas of operation like Iraq.189 The Court had 
already answered this question in the negative. But in light of the 
ECtHR ruling in Al-Skeini, the British High Court reversed itself and 
made a marked departure from its precedence. The Court, in a 4-to-3 
decision, allowed the claim to proceed under Article 2 of the ECtHR 
as its basis. The majority opinion, written by Lord Hope, took great 
efforts to make its legal trepidations known: 
[the battlefield] is a field of human activity which the 
law should enter into with great caution . . . [i]t risks 
undermining the ability of a state to defend itself, or 
                                                 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at para.13. 
188 Tugendhat, supra note 26, at 31. 
189 Supra note 178. 
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its interest, at home or abroad. The world is a 
dangerous place, and states cannot disable themselves 
from meeting its challenges.  Ultimately democracy 
itself may be at risk.190 
The Court, however, held that the claims may go forward and 
granted jurisdiction to the families of the fallen Soldiers to pursue 
their Article 2 claims. The Court found jurisdiction under these facts, 
but it limited jurisdiction “in connection with the planning for and 
conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which 
are unrealistic or disproportionate.”191 In other words, the egregious 
facts of this case drove the result. This ‘middle ground,’ a word 
choice of Lord Hope,192 was a direct extension of the expansive 
scope of Al-Skeini. 
Lord Hope’s sentiment that “operations conducted in the 
face of the enemy are inherently unpredictable”193 is a truism. This 
judgment allows individuals, Soldiers in this case, to question and 
challenge the decisions of the military’s leadership. The middle 
ground is no ground at all. The reality must be clear: legal mission 
creep will occur. The law and its profession is a product of examining 
events after the fact—ex post facto. The profession of arms and the 
law that supports it under IHL are not; International Humanitarian 
Law is a product of using judgment before force is used. This is why 
Soldiers train and prepare for conflict knowing the moment they see 
conflict, all plans will morph once there is contact with the enemy. As 
Lord Hope acknowledges: 
[t]hings tend to look and feel very different on the 
battlefield from the way they look on such charts and 
images as those behind the lines may have available to 
them. A court should be very slow indeed to question 
                                                 
190 Id. at para. 66. 
191 Id. at para. 76. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at para. 64. 
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operational decisions made on the ground by 
commanders, whatever their rank or level seniority.194 
However, the door has been opened and with it, an inevitable 
breed of military officer who is hesitant and timid. War is foggy and 
unpredictable. If courts, through litigants, are allowed to second-
guess military decisions that ultimately lead men and women to their 
deaths, then conservatism and restraint will descend upon military 
decisions. Both concepts are and should be an anathema to the 
warrior ethos.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
International Humanitarian Law was created so that Soldiers 
did not bear the responsibility of the actions of the public; it allows 
the Soldier to commit acts on behalf of the State that would be illegal 
otherwise. When we narrow what the Soldier can do, we eliminate 
their ability to effectuate the end of the war. The five trends 
discussed, if brought to fruition and taken collectively, suffocate the 
Soldier. They leave a Soldier virtually helpless. The advantage goes to 
the actor who fails to follow the rules and is asymmetric in his 
infliction of violence. Instead of probing how to hold the hostile 
civilian accountable, the trend is to impose rules on the lawful 
combatant that mirror what would be imposed on a police officer. 
The trend is pushing jurisprudence in the wrong direction. The 
asymmetric fighter will not change tactics, and, in fact, limiting the 
Soldier will embolden these fighters. Giving such a profound 
advantage to the enemy, limits a Soldier’s ability to determine what is 
militarily necessary and in the process, prolongs the war and prolongs 
the Soldiers’ exposure to harm. 
Jus in bello is the evolved product of centuries of customary 
practice by countless military professionals. Its core principles of 
distinction, military necessity, and proportionality provide the proper 
balance between mission and humanity in an armed conflict. They are 
entirely separate and morally and legally distinct from the concept of 
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jus ad bellum. If properly applied, they protect the warfighter from the 
blending of the management of governance and the management of 
violence. They do not require supplement by the very dissimilar 
jurisprudence of traditional criminal law to properly analyze actions 
on the battlefield. They continually evolve, but in a careful, deliberate 
manner as the cost of error is too great for not only the warfighter 
but also the community of international States. However, because the 
principles are concepts rooted in the totally unique human 
experience, they should only be adjudicated by courts with a level of 
military competence and experience, not any criminal court that 
extends its jurisdiction in order to make a public statement about a 
given conflict. 
Returning to our two incidents from the introduction – one 
in South Carolina, one in Afghanistan -- the rules that govern the two 
are profoundly different. In armed conflict, the three core principles 
of jus in bello in the Just War Theory are effective in analyzing the 
legality of Captain Kudo’s decision; these principles are simply 
irrelevant for judging Officer Groubert’s actions. For Captain Kudo’s 
scenario, his subjective belief was that the two diggers were either 
Taliban or civilians directly engaged in armed conflict because they 
were actively planting an IED in the road. If the belief is true, they 
are lawful military targets and the attack would also comply with 
military necessity and proportionality since there is no evidence of 
any collateral damage to civilians. Even if it turns that Captain Kudo 
was incorrect and the diggers were civilian farmers, the attack would 
still be lawful if his belief was objectively reasonable when viewed 
through the eyes of a professional warfighter in a same or similar 
situation. 
In armed conflict, unlike the law enforcement situation in 
South Carolina, when the attacks are done by members of uniformed 
military as part of an armed conflict, privileged belligerency would 
apply to those acts. Those privileged belligerents are authorized by 
the principle of military necessity to make attacks based on the status 
of the targeted victim as a military target. As members of a force 
engaged in armed conflict with the coalition, the diggers would 
qualify as lawful military targets. The elimination of enemy forces is 
an integral part of the mandate from military necessity to secure “the 
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complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible”195 and 
thereby end the conflict. Therefore, an attack would turn on a 
question of proportionality: did the concrete military advantage 
exceed the collateral cost in terms of damage to civilian lives and 
property? However, it is important to limit the proportionality 
analysis to the facts known by the attackers at the time of the attack. 
Any post hoc judgment based upon the results of the attack is unjust. 
The principle of proportionality is based upon the expected concrete 
military advantage gained and the expected collateral damage, not the 
result. Even if the attackers knew that civilians would die in the 
attack, the attack would still be lawful if the expected military 
advantage outweighed the expected collateral damage to civilians. 
These protection under IHL have no relevancy for Officer 
Groubert; his situation requires a self-defense analysis under 
common criminal law. Captain Kudo’s situation is not nor should it 
be subject to the same analysis. 
War is arguably the evilest practice of mankind and all of 
humanity should work to prevent any and all future wars. Until that 
day arrives, however, we must be careful to preserve and enforce all 
three goals of jus in bello. The goals of bringing about a rapid end to 
the conflict and limiting the cost to the belligerents are every bit as 
important as the goal of avoiding civilian deaths and property 
damage. 
 
                                                 
195  See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 277 (2010) (citing U.S. 
Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1956) 
para. 3. a. at 4). 
